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THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS ON LAW:
 1 A QuANTITATIVE STUDY
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner’
I often say that when you can measure
what you are speaking about, and express it in
numbers, you know something about it; but
when you cannot express it in numbers, your
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory
kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge,
but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, ad-
vanced to the stage of Science, whatever the
matter may be.
-Si r  Wil l iam Thomson
(Lord Kelvin)
Introduction
Economic analysis of law-“law and economics,” as it is more
commonly called-is widely considered, and not only by its practi-
tioners, the most influential development in legal thought since the
demise of legal realism in the early 1940s; certainly the most
influential of the explicitly interdisciplinary ("law and...") move-
ments. Well, but what does “most influential” mean exactly? And
are these statements about law and economics true? And is the
influence of law and economics rising, falling, or holding steady?
* Landes  is  the  Cl i f ton R.  Musser  Professor  of  Economics  a t  the
University of Chicago Law School; Posner is a judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a Senior Lecturer at the Law School.
This paper is the revision of a paper prepared for the University of Chicago’s
John M. Olin Centennial Conference on Law and Economics, April 7-9,
1992, and is dedicated to the memory of George Stigler-a seminal figure
both in economic analysis of law and in citation studies, and a dear friend.
The  au tho r s  t hank  Jona than  Cohen ,  Mary  J ane  DeWeese ,  and  Kev in
Esterling for their excellent research assistance and especially Brian Weimer
for his many helpful suggestions and excellent computer skills, as well as the
commenters on the paper, Guido Calabresi and Lawrence Lessig, whose com-
ments have led us to make significant revisions.
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Influence, like cause in history, is exceedingly difficult to deter-
mine, because of its severely counterfactual quality. To say that X
influenced Y is to say that, had X never existed, Y would be differ-
ent in some particular way, or at least that more time would have
been required for the particular difference to occur (that is, X may
merely have accelerated changes in Y that would in time have oc-
curred anyway). But X did come into existence, so how is one to
figure out how things would have stood if it hadn’t? And if an
influence is impalpable, even more so are changes in it and the rela-
tion between it and other influences. Is law and economics as
influential today as it was ten or twenty years ago? As influential as
other movements, such as critical legal studies and feminist jurispru-
dence? And influential on what, exactly?
We can venture a few suggestions. Let us first divide Y (the
thing putatively influenced) into three pieces: economics generally,
practical law, and academic law. Coase’s famous article on social
cost strikingly illustrates the influence of that analysis on eco-
nomics generally. It is, perhaps, a rare illustration of that influence,
but not a completely isolated one. No one would deny Jeremy Ben-
tham an influential role in economics. But besides the fact that he
was trained as a lawyer (though he never practiced), he elaborated
his utilitarian theory in discussions of legal themes ranging from
Blackstone and the common law to legislation, legal codes, and
criminal punishment. Economic analysis of theft and monopolies
has contributed to the growing economic literature on rent-seeking
generally, economic analysis of the judiciary to the literature (a hy-
brid of economics and political science but with the former domi-
nant) of public choice, economic analysis of antitrust to industrial
organization, and economic analysis of bankruptcy and secured
lending to the literatures on corporate finance and on agency costs.
The largest contributions of law and economics, however, have
been to law-to the practice of law, but even more to academic law.
Take practice first. Few would deny that antitrust law has been
1 R H Coase The Problem  of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and
Economi’cs ; (1960):
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transformed in the past thirty years by economics, at least in vocab-
ulary-for it is possible that conservative judges would have reached
similar results without economics; but they would have couched
their opinions in radically different terms. The impress of eco-
nomics is strong on the calculation of damages in tort, contract, se-
curities, and other types of cases, and even on monetary relief in di-
vorce cases. Economic evidence plays a big role in environmental
and discrimination litigation, and a growing role in contract, labor,
tax, corporate, and pension law and in litigation over the award of
attorneys’ fees. Judges are increasingly receptive to economic argu-
ments-and only in part is this due to the fact that some judges ap-
pointed since 1980 are practitioners or former practitioners of eco-
nomic analysis of law.2
The greatest impact of law and economics, however, has been
on legal teaching and scholarship. Given the age and methodologi-
cal conservatism of most judges and law partners, it is only to be ex-
pected that a new movement in legal thought would have its great-
est initial impact in the academy and from there radiate out to prac-
tice. Although law and economics traces back to Bentham, and
more immediately to work of Becker, Calabresi, Coase, Director,
Manne, Stigler, and others in the 1950s and 196Os,  it is only since
the early 1970s that the movement has had significant visibility in
legal circles, and that is too recent a period to have a profound effect
on the practical side of the legal profession. But the effect on aca-
demic law can fairly be described as profound. The appointment of
economists, but of virtually no other nonlawyers, to the faculty of
all major, and many other, law schools is one token. The seepage of
economic terms and concepts into the teaching of conventional le-
gal subjects by law professors who do not consider themselves
members of the law and economics movement is another. The
high rank that many law and economics scholars occupy in the
academic legal pecking order is still another. Also to be noted are
2 On the incre asing sensi tivity of Supreme Court Justices to the insights
of economics, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: Th e Court and the
Economic System, 98 Harvard Law Review 4 (1984).
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some distinguished "conversions" to law and economics of scholars
previously hostile or lukewarm, such as Richard EpsteiA-and the
fact that another major recent movement in legal thought, critical
legal studies, virtually defines itself by opposition to law and eco-
nomics.4
Twenty years, however, can be a Lifetime for an academic move-
ment. Legal realism died after twenty years. The legal process
school inaugurated by Hart and Sacks flowered for only about a
decade. The famous “New Criticism” in literature did not obtain a
strong hold in English departments until the 1940s, and its hold
had weakened substantially by the late 1960s. Logical positivism
swept philosophy in the 1930s, but was dying by the 1960s.
Structuralism in anthropology and sociology, and monopolistic
competition in economics, are other recent academic flameouts.
‘Workable” competition, once the rage in industrial organization, is
as passe as the Nehru jacket or chicken a la king. Many of these de-
ceased movements left permanent residues-some, such as legal
realism, may be thought to have triumphed, to have died, as it were,
of success. But die it did.
What is or will be the life cycle of law and economics? Profes-
sor Horwitz wrote in 1980, “I have the strong feeling that the eco-
nomic analysis of law has ‘peaked out’ as the latest fad in legal
scholarship and that it will soon be treated by the historians of legal
thought like the writings of Lasswell and McDougal. Future legal
historians will need to exercise their imaginations to figure out why
so many people could have taken most of this stuff so seriously.“5
This crowing may have been premature, for nine years later
Professor Fiss could say only that “law and economics...seems to
have peaked? He gave no evidence and perhaps he was indulging
3 See his paper for this conference.
4 See e g Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987),  pas-9 ’ ‘9
sim.
5 Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics:  Science  or Politics? 8 Hofstra
Law Review 905 (1980).
6 Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 Cornell  Law Review 245
(19893.
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in wishful thinking too. Yet writing from within the movement,
Professor Ellickson has expressed concern that law and economics
will stagnate unless it borrows from other fields, such as anthropol-
ogy? Stigler, while “impressed by the width of the foothold that
economics has obtained in law schools,” finds that the proportion
of articles in law journals that are written by economists declined in
the 1980s and that “there appears to be only a moderate impact of
economics in these areas [torts and contracts] even when we require
only a modest attention to economics to qualify.“* And what are we
to make of apparent defections from the field, such as Robert Bork
and Anthony Kronman? Or of those law and economics scholars
who have seemed to want to diversify their scholarly portfolios by
turning to other fields? Or of the growing mathematization of
economics., which some fear could drive a wedge between eco-
nomics and law, and perhaps make the two fields mutually un-
intelligible?
These questions could be debated endlessly, with all the rhetori-
cal flourishes that characterize argumentative scholarship. We want
to try a new approach. We want to examine influence quantita-
tively. The approach is not completely new. Stigler (note 8) looked
at publications in legal and in economic journals, and Ellickson
(note 7) examined the publications of faculty at four “elite” law
schools, to see whether the fraction of economic scholarship was
still growing (he found it was not). Stigler characterized as
“moderate?’ what one might have supposed a high fraction of eco-
nomics-influenced discussions of torts and contract: 40 percent.
But his sample was tiny. Ellickson’s sample was small, too, and also
skewed. More fundamentally, a focus on growth in “market shares”
as a test of a field’s vitality encounters the problem that such growth
is truncated at 100 percent. If law and economics grew to the point
where 95 percent of the articles published on law were economic,
7 Robert  C. Ell’ kslc on, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique  of Classical  Law and Economics,  65 Chicago-Kent Law
Review 23 (1989).
8 George J. Stigler, Law or Economics?  (forthcoming  in Journal  of Law
and Economics).
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and stopped there, it would be weird to argue that law and eco-
nomics had stalled. It might in fact be growing rapidly, because le-
gal scholarship as a whole was growing rapidly. And the fact that it
was not growing relatively would be natural, and, beyond some
point, inevitable.9
We use a different quantitative method. We use citations by
other scholars (and, occasionally, by judges) to a scholar’s work, or
to a journal (because there are several journals that specialize in law
and economics), or to a class of articles (for example, economics ar-
ticles, or critical legal studies articles, or legal-doctrinal articles) as a
proxy for influence on law. Citation analysis, which is used primar-
ily as we shall use it here to study influence but is also used as a
method of ranking schools, journals, and individual scholars, of
measuring reputation, and even of evaluating the scholarship of
candidates for tenure appointments, is an established branch of so-
cial science scholarship. 10 We have used it in our previous work,11 as
have other students of law. 12 We use it here without apologies. We
are conscious of its shortcomings, and shall note them from time to
time as they become relevant, but here we point out that in large
9 For these and other criticisms  of Ellickson’s analysis, see Richard A.
Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65
Chicago-Kent  Law Review 57 (1989).
10 See, e.g., Eugene  Garfield, Citation Indexing: Its Theory and
Application  in Science, Technology, and Humanities  (1979),  and other works
cited in Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation  69-71  (1990);
also Marshall H. Medoff, The Ranking of Economists, 20 Journal of
Economic  Education  405 (1989); Julie A. Virgo, A Statistical Procedure for
Evaluating the Importance of Scientific Papers, 47 Library Quarterly 515
(1977); Daniel 0. O’Connor and Henry Voos, Empirical Laws, Theory
Construction and Bibliometerics,  Library Trends, summer 1981, at 9; Linda
C. Smith, Citation. Analysis, in id. at 83; S.J. Leibowitz  and J.P. Palmer,
Assessing the Relative Impacts of Economics Journals, 22 Journal of
Economic Literature 77 (1984).
XL William M . Landes and Richard A. Posner,  Legal Precedent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 Journal  of Law and Economics 249
(1976);  Landes and Posner, Legal Change, Judicial  Behavior, and the
Diversity Jurisdiction,  9 Journal of Legal Studies 367 (1980); Posner, note 10
above, at 69-89.
l2 See list in id. at 72 n. 21.
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samples random data errors tend to cancel out. Also, a common
criticism of citation analysis when it is used as an evaluative tool is
inapplicable, or largely so, when it is used to study influence: that a
critical citation should not be weighted as heavily as a favorable one
and maybe should not be counted at all or even given a negative
weight. When speaking of influence rather than quality, one has
no call to denigrate critical citations. Scholars rarely bother to
criticize work that they don’t think is or is likely to become
influential. They ignore it. Many favorable citations, moreover, are
tokens of friendship or obeisance to colleagues, influential seniors,
acolytes, and journal editors; so, if critical citations should be dis-
counted, favorable ones should be also, and it is easier to give all the
same weight.
We are not only interested in the influence of the law and eco-
nomics movement relative to other movements in law (so this is a
study not just of law and economics, but of legal thought gener-
ally). We are also interested in broader questions in the sociology
and economics of scholarship, including the role of specialized
journals in the propagation of a school of thought, the role of in-
terdisciplinary collaboration (such as a paper coauthored by an
economist and a lawyer-this paper, for example), the decline of
“professionalism” (proxied by doctrinal scholarship) in academic law,
and the life cycle of citations to an individual scholar’s work. So the
paper has an analytic as well as a descriptive component.
The source of our data is the Social Sciences Citation Index
(SSCI), which is published, along with citation indexes for the
natural sciences and for the arts and humanities, by the Institute for
Scientific Information (ISI). SSCI tabulates citations in about
1400 social science (including law) journals. The number varies
from year to year because journals are added and deleted in con-
formity with ISI’s policy of including in its various indexes those
journals that are cited most frequently. At present SSCI covers
about 100 law journals, including 30 to 40 student-edited journals
such as the Harvard Law Review, specialized law journals such as
the Banking Law Journal,  and interdisciplinary law journals such as
the American Journal of Legal History. The interdisciplinary law
8 CHICAGO  WORKING PAPER IN LAW 8c ECONOMICS
journals surveyed include both the Journal of Law and Economics
(JLE) and the Journal of Legal Studies (JLS), but exclude, for all or
most of our sample period, the three other principal law and eco-
nomics journals, the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
(JLEO), the International Review of  and Economics (IRLE),
and Research in Law and Economics (an annual)? SSCI records
citations from the articles in the surveyed journals to all publica-
tions. So, for example, a citation in an article in a surveyed journal
to Shavell's book Economic Analysis of Accident Law or to one of
his articles published in the IRLE is recorded as a citation to
Shavell even though neither his book nor his article is surveyed,
whereas a citation to a Posner article in Shavell’s book or IRLE ar-
ticle would not be counted as a Posner citation. SSCI records cita-
tions only to the first author listed of works that are written by two
or more authors. Thus, a cited paper by Polinsky and Shavell would
count as a citation to Polinsky but not to Shavell. If the order of
the authors were reversed, Shavell would receive the citation.
Citation Analysis of MoZars
Law and Economics ScboZars. We begin with citations between
1976 and 1990 to the writings of three groups of law and eco-
nomics scholars. 1976 is the first year for which the necessary data
are available in SSCI on an annual basis; it is also close to the be-
ginning of the growth spurt for law and economics. 1990 is the last
year for which we have been able to obtain complete data.
1. The first group consists of all economists without law degrees
who currently are faculty members at one of the 15 “best” law
schools. 14 This sample includes 13 economists, of whom 12 have
had teaching or research positions for more than fifteen years, and
l3 The JLEO was added to the journals surveyed by SSCI in May 1989.
The IRLE is still not surveyed; nor is Research in Law and Economics.
I4 As listed in the April 29, 1991, issues of U.S. News & World Report.
The rankings are based on a variety of factors including  student selectivity,
placement success, faculty resources,  and ranking by law professions, lawyers,
and judges.
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10 have been on law school faculties for at least ten years.15 It is
because citations have to be counted manually from the Social
Science Citation Index that we have limited the sample to
economists at the 15 leading schools. Although as a result we can-
not measure the overall contribution by economists at all law
schools, a new movement is likely to begin in elite schools and then
percolate outward to the rest, so that penetration of the elite market
may be a good “leading indicator” of a field’s growth.
2. The second group is law professors at the same “best” law
schools who have Ph.D.'s in economics. This “joint degree” group
contains 10 scholars. Most are relatively recent law school gradu-
ates, although two have been teaching law for more than fifteen
years.
3. The final group is the four scholars honored as “founders of
law and economics” at the inaugural meeting of the American Law
and Economics Association in May 1991.16 The four are Calabresi,
Coase, Manne, and Posner.
A word of caution about these samples. Restricted as they are to
a total of 27 scholars all of whom (except the “founders”) are living
economics Ph.D.‘s  who teach at leading law schools, they exclude a
large number of important contributors to law and economics. One
l5 Our sample thus consists of Cooter, Goetz, Goldberg, Haddock, Hay,
Klevorick, Landes, Polinsky, Rose-Ackerman, Rubinfeld, Salop, Shavell and
Wachter. Although some of these economists have joint appointments, their
principal appointments are in law schools. A case can be made for including
Oliver Williamson in this sample because he has held a joint appointment at
a law school for more than ten years. We exclude Williamson, however, be-
cause his principal affiliation was not with a law school over the sample pe-
riod, and he is not listed in the AALS Directory of Law Teachers, 19919
1992, whereas the other economists in our sample are. We also exclude emeri-
tus professors from the sample such as Ronald Coase (who is included in our
“founders of law and economi&’ sample), as well as other economics profes-
sors such as Williamson
principal appointment is
l6 We emphasize th
and economics field, no
Association, which they,
below,
who may teach a course at a law school but whose
in another department or school.
.at they were honored as founders of the (modern) law
t as founders of the American Law and Economics
or at least most of them, were not. And see note 36
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excluded group consists of economists who have contributed to the
scholarly literature on law and economics, including some who
have made seminal contributions such as Gary Becker and George
Stigler, who either have not held faculty appointments at law
schools, or, if they have, whose principal appointment is (was) else-
where. Also excluded (except for three of the “founders”) are law
professors without Ph.D.'s in economics whose major scholarship is
in law ‘and economics. This is the largest group of law and eco-
nomic scholars-a fact that attests to the acceptance of economics
(particularly among younger faculty members) as an important tool
for analyzing legal doctrines, especially in private law, such as torts
and contracts, and business-related areas, such as corporations, se-
curities, antitrust, commercial law, and bankruptcy.
Expanding our sample to include these two groups would have
forced difficult choices concerning whom to include and which
books and articles to count as contributions to law and economicslir
and also would have strained our resources. In further defense of
our more limited study we point that we use easy--to--define criteria
for selection, that we focus on individuals indisputably specializing
in law and economics, and that our sample enables us to answer a
number of interesting questions. .
T&e Economists.  Table 1 presents citation data for the Ph.D.
economists. We have divided their citations into three classes-cita-
tions in law journals, citations in law and economics journals (that
is, JLE and JLS), and citations in economics journals~8-and three
I7 A pretty good measure of the number of scholars who would be in-
cluded in a comprehensive sample would be the more than 400 members of the
recently formed American Law and Economics Association. More than 50
percent of its members have appointments at law schools and another 30 per-
cent have academic appointments primarily in economics departments or busi-
ness schools.
l* “Citations in economic journals” is a little misleading. It is the differ-
ence between total citations and the sum of citations in law journals and in
law and economics journals. It thus includes some, though presumably few,
citations in social science journals other than economics journals. It does not,
however, include anv citations in journals  covered by ISI’s other citation in-4
dexes.
INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS  ON LAW II
periods: 1976-1980, 1981-1985, and 1986-1990. So the 283 law
citations for 1976.1980 signifies that the 13 economists in the
sample were cited a total of 283 times in law journals in the period
1976 through 1980. Twelve of the 13 economists in the sample be-
gan their academic careers before 1976 (and another started in
1980) but only 7 were members of law school faculties in 1980 and
2 of these had been appointed that year. None began their aca-
demic careers at law schools, and although they averaged 19 years in
teaching as of 1990, their average law school tenure was only 10
years. We infer that law schools follow an understandably conser-
vative procedure of hiring economists (as distinct from lawyers or
lawyer-economists) who have established reputations and have al--
ready published in law and economics.
*
TABLE 1
CITATIONS TO ECONOMISTS, 1976 - 1990
L
b
Citations 19764980 19814985 19864990II
Total 1097 3105 4018
Econ. 753 1331 1494
Law & Econ. 61 279 297
Law 283 1495 2227
I
no. teaching 13 13 13
-at law schools 7 12 13
/
Table 1 reveals that the number of citations increase sharply
both over time and with experience, which we define as the num-
ber of years from the year of one’s first full-time teaching or re-
search position to 1990. Experience so defined is positively corre-
lated with the number of one’s publications; and the more publica-
tions one has, the larger the capital stock of one’s work for others to
draw on, which in turn increases the likelihood that one of those
publications will be cited and hence the frequency of citations.19
l9 Our data include self-citations, but they turn out to be quantitatively
unimportant except in some cases where the person has few citations.
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Since one’s capital stock is likely to decline eventually as the depre-
ciation of one’s existing publications overtakes new publications,
Table 1 suggests that overall our sample of economists are still in
the capital-formation phase of their careers.
What inferences can be drawn from Table 1 about the growth
of law and economics? The fact that total citations increased four-
fold between 1976 and 1990 could reflect an increase in number of
publications as a function of experience, rather than a growing im-
portance of economics in law. But the fact that the share of cita-
tions that appeared in law journals increased from 25.8 percent in
19764980 to 55.4 percent in 1986-1990 suggests that more than
experience is at work. The basis for this suggestion is the possibility
of adjusting for experience by comparing the time patterns of cita-
tions in the “economic” and the “law and economics” journal
classes. The former should understate the effect of experience, the
latter overstate it. Most of the economists in our sample began
teaching at law schools between 1976 and 1980 and since then
their publications have become more specialized to law and eco-
nomics. A reasonable inference is that their recent publications are
of less interest to economists, so citations in the economic journals
surveyed in SSCI should increase more slowly than one would pre-
dict from experience alone. Conversely, increasing specialization
implies that citations in the law and economics journals will in-
crease more rapidly than would be predicted from experience alone.
And so we find. Table 1 shows that while citations to our
economist sample increased by about 100 percent in the economic
journals, they increased by 400 percent in the law and economics
journals and by nearly 700 percent in the law journals, even though
the number of law journals surveyed by SSCI declined during this
period. One hundred percent and 400 percent seem plausible
brackets for the increase’ in citations that might be expected to
occur over the course of more than a decade of a scholar’s early
career because the number of his publications was increasing rapidly
during that stage of his career. The much more rapid growth (and
increasing share) of citations in law journals to our economists sug-
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gests that economic analysis of law grew rapidly between 1976 and
the four--year period ending in 1990.
Two economists (Landes and Goetz) account for more than 45
percent of the law-journal citations in this sample. Both have co-
authored many articles with law professors (Landes with Posner,
and Goetz with Scott). This suggests-though weakly, because of
the tininess of the sample-that a law and economics article has a
greater impact on the authors of articles in law journals when it
contains a larger dollop of legal culture than the typical law and
economics article written by an economist. For that dollop makes
the economic analysis more accessible to the law-trained scholar.
We are surprised that collaborative writing between lawyers and
economists is not more common than it is, but the joint-degree
phenomenon is increasingly common and perhaps transaction costs
are lowered when the collaborating lawyer-economist team consists
of one person!20
Regression analysis enables us to be more precise about the rela-
tion among citations, experience, and the growth of economics in
law. Let Cgdenote the number of citations to the ith individual (i
= l,...,l3 in the economist sample) in year j (where j ranges from
1976 to 1990). C;j depends on both i’s intellectual capital at time j
(or accumulated publications at time j adjusted for both quality and
depreciation) and the market demand of other scholars for this
capital, as in
(1) Cij = DjKg
where Dj and K.. denote respectively the market demand per unit
of capital and i’s capital in period j. Lacking direct measures of Dj
and I$, we approximate them by
(3) D .J = exp(d + b3Tj + vj)
2o Incidentally, it is fortunate that Goetz and Landes precede Scott and
Posner in the alphabet and that these authorial teams list the authors’ names
in alphabetical order, since, as we noted earlier, SSCI records cited articles
only under the name of the author whose name is printed first.
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where exp(x) denotes e to the power (x); k and d are constant terms;
Yg denotes i’s years of experience in year j2$ q denotes time (1976 =
1, 1977 = 2, and so forth); and W;J’ and vj are random error terms.
We expect that bl > 0 and & < 0 because we hypothesize that i’s in-
tellectual capital will increase with experience, though at a decreas-
ing rate, until depreciation overtakes new investment. Two
economists with the same amount of experience might have differ-
ent amounts of capital because one had produced more and (or)
better publications. This would be reflected in different values for ki,
and possibly bl and b2 for the two economists. Whether b3 is
positive or negative will depend on whether the demand by other
scholars for i’s capital is increasing or decreasing over time. So if the
influence of law and economics is growing, we would expect b3 to
be positive. Substituting (2) and (3) into (l), taking logs, and
rewriting yields
where b = k + dand u;J’= W;I’ + vj. Equation (4) cannot be estimated
for an individual because time and experience are perfectly corre-
lated, but can be estimated across a group of individuals who differ
in experience.22
21 We define experience as follows. If individual i started his academic or
research career in year x, experience takes the value 1 in year (x + 1), and SO
forth. Thus, we allow an individual one year from the time he begins his full
time academic or research appointment before he accumulates one unit of intel-
lectual capital.
22 As noted above, individuals will obviously differ in "quality,” i.e., in
the amount of capital, even if they have identical levels of experience. As a
consequence, they will receive different numbers of citations, holding experi-
ence constant. If we added economist-specific categorical (or dummy) variables
to hold constant unobservable quality differences among the economists, we
would not be able to estimate equation (4), because then experience would be a
linear combination of time and the economist-specific variables. The absence
of economist-specific variables means that there will be a significant amount of
unexplained variation in citations in our sample after controlling for experi-
ence and time. Still, our estimates of & and & will be unbiased, provided that
quality is not systematically correlated with experience. In our larger samples,
such correlations are unlikely, but they may occur in the smaller ones. So one
should be cautious about drawing firm conclusions from the smaller samples.
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Equation (4) borrows from the human capital literature, which
relates the natural logarithm of earnings to experience (or years on
the job) and to experience squared, the latter variable being included
to capture the decreasing rate at which earnings grow with experi-
ence 23 The human capital model hypothesizes that earnings in-
crease with on-the-job training, at least until depreciation more
than offsets new investment in human capital. We hypothesize
that the combination of a reduction in academic output beyond
some age, combined with depreciation of earlier publications, will
eventually lead to a reduction in annual citations. Citations may
have a bigger component of depreciation than earnings: the key
ideas in influential works may become so well known that they be-
come matters of general knowledge and are either no longer cited
or are cited indirectly in citations to textbooks or survey articlesJ4
Since data on human capital acquired on the job are unobtainable,
earnings equations proxy such capital by years of experience. Simi-
larly, we approximate scholarly capital by years of experience.25
Other parallels between citations and earnings are that both vari-
ables reflect market valuations of an individual (provided self-cita-
23 The standard  earnings equation  also includes  a years-of-schooling
variable and may include other variables (depending on the particular sample),
such as race, region, industry, and sex. Jacob Mincer, Schooling, Experience
and Larninw ( lYI4): aherwin Kosen, lJistinpuished k ellow: Mrncerrng
t n a .. . I/ T rn I. n 0.- A *k /A nnn\ ULabor Economics,  6 Journal of: Uonomic Yerspectrves  IS/ (1YYL).
24 A famous example is the Coase Theorem,  introduced in Coase’s  1960
paper on social  cost, note 1 above. Another is the economic  distinction  be-
tween property  rights and liability rules, introduced  in Guido Calabresi and
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,  Liability  Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,  85 Harvard Law Review 1089 (1972).
25 We could have used an individual’s accumulated  publications  or accu-
mulated pages published as a proxy for human capital rather than experience.
But such an approach would treat articles (or pages) as fungible,  ignoring the
rather conspicuous  fact that some articles are more infIuentia1  than others, so
that two individuals may have written the same number of articles  or pages but
have vastly different stocks of the relevant human capital. Since experience  is
both easy to measure and not obviously inferior to publications  as a measure  of
human capital, we use experience.
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tions are ignored) and that both respond to investments in human
capital. 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis. It is based on
190 observations-fifteen years of citations for 12 economists (180
observations) and ten years for one economist.
TABLE 2
REGRESSION ANALYSIS  OF CITATIONS TO
ECONOMISTS
Indepen- Law Econ. Total
dent b t-ratio b t-ratio b t-ratio
Variable
Y .297 (2.96) ,271 (3.53) .266 (3.54)
I? -.008 (-2.06) 0.012 (-4.16) -.009 (-3.23)
T l 195 (4.40) .122 (3.59) .128 (3.86)
R2 = .33 R2 = .13 R2 = .22
n= 190 n= 190 n= 190
Notes: (1) R2 = adjusted coefficient  of variation.)
0 n= number of observations.
(3) Citations in the two law and economics  journals are
included  in the “total” categorv only.
The signs of the regression coefficients on experience (Y) and
experience-squared (E2) variables are consistent with the predictions
of the human capital model: experience has a positive effect on cita-
tions, experience squared a negative one, and both are statistically
significant. The coefficient of P implies a gradual decline in the
percentage increase in annual citations associated with an increase
in experience. Holding constant the demand for one’s human capi-
tal (i.e., assuming the regression coefficient on time to be zero), an
individual’s citations peak somewhere between 11 and 20 years of
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experience.26 Beyond that point, citations decline because the de-
preciation of one’s stock of past publications dominates the effect of
additional publications, which diminish (eventually, of course, to
zero) 27 The latest average peak year for the economists in our three
groups of citing journals comes in the law journals. This is as
expected. The longest lag in the reception of scholarly work is likely
to be interdisciplinary-it takes longer for lawyers to appreciate the
contributions of economists than for economists to do so.
The different values of the regression coefficients of time
confirm our earlier suggestion that citations to our economist sam-
ple have increased more rapidly in law journals than in other journal
categories. If experience is held constant, citations increased at an
annual rate of nearly 20 percent in law journals over the 1976 to
1990 period, 12 percent in economic journals, and 13 percent in all
journals (which includes the two surveyed law and economic jour-
nals). We can also estimate peak citation years that reflect the
growth of citations as a function of time-that is, of the demand
for the cited works in the intellectual marketplace-together with
experience. 28 Since demand is growing in all our categories of cita-
tions, the peak citation years are later than they are in the calcula-
tions (which abstract from the growth in demand) in note 26.
They differ across journals in the expected direction: 32 years in law
journals, 17 years in economics journals, and 22 years in all journals.
It would be a mistake to assume, however, that (for example) law-
journal citations to the sample will actually peak after 32 years of
experience. That would assume that the phenomenal 20 percent
26 We calculate the year in which citations peak by taking the derivative
of the regression  with respect  to experience and setting its value equal to zero.
That is, we set
a?& c/a= bl + 2&Y = 0,
which yields a peak number of citations  of 19.3 years experience in law jour-
nals, 11.4 years in economics and 14.7 years for all citations.
27 Though it would be a mistake to suppose that death automatically ter-
minates new publication.  Some works are published  posthumously.
28 This is calculated by setting
din c/a= b, + 2&Y+ b@T/dE) = 0,
and solving for Y (noting  that J7’/dE = 1). .
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annual rate of growth of law-journal citations to economists will
continue’ for many years into the future.
Part of the explanation for the differences in citations growth
across types of journal may be that as the economists joined law
school faculties, they immersed themselves in law, and lawyers
found their work more useful and interesting, while at the same
time economists found their work relatively less interesting. A re-
lated explanation is that economists who join law faculties are more
likely to coauthor articles with lawyers, and such joint work may be
particularly accessible to, and therefore cited by, authors of law re-
view articles. Neither explanation denies the growing influence of
economics on law; each helps to show the path along which that
influence operates.
A related question is how much of the growth of economic ci-
tations in law is due to the fact that more economists, joint-degree
scholars, and economically minded law professors are writing in law
journals and citing each other and how much is due to a growing
use of economics by law professors whose basic approach is not
economic. The second is the more direct measure of the influence
of economics on law, so it is pertinent that Stigler (note 8) found a
declining proportion of major articles in the law journals of Har-
vard, Chicago, and Yale that were written by economists but an in-
crease from 33 to 40 percent in the number of articles on torts and
contracts in the same three law journals that had some economic
c o n t e n t .
To explore this issue further, we have classified by type-eco-
nomic, legal-doctrinal, critical legal studies, feminist, political-theo-
retic, law and society, law and literature, empirical, etc.-the articles
published in the law journals of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard,
Stanford, and Yale from 1976 to 1990. Table 3 summarizes the,
results for the economic, the legal-doctrinal, and the remaining
types of article. Although economic articles have grown from 11.5
percent to 18.7 percent of the total over the entire period, there has
been little change since the 1981~1985 period. This suggests that
the growth in the number of citations to economists in law jour-
nals since 1981-and the growth has continued unabated since
INFLUENCE  OF ECONOMICS  ON LAW I9
then, as we are about to see-cannot be attributed to growth in the
number of economic articles in law reviews.z9 It must, since most
of the other articles are written by noneconomically minded
lawyers, reflect the growing penetration of economics in legal
scholarship generally. Granted, this may reflect a general rise in
academic lawyers’ interest in interdisciplinary scholarship. For note
the sharp decline in the share of doctrinal articles and the concomi-
tant rise in the “other” category. Doctrinal articles fell from 58.8 to
34.2 percent, while the “other” category increased from 29.8 to 47.2
percent.
The aggregate data reported in Table 3 mask significant year-
to-year variations-which is not surprising in a sample limited to
five law reviews. For example, the annual percentage “market”
shares of economic articles since 1981 are 14 (1981), 20 (1982), 19
(1983), 22 (1984), 25 (1985), 18 (1986) 20 (1987), 12 (1988), 27
(1989) and 17 (1990). Although the annual data may seem to sug-
gest no growth or even a slight decline since the mid-1980s, it
would be a mistake to infer from these data alone that law and
economics has peaked. First, number of articles is not the same as
influence, which is what our study seeks to quantify. Second, it is
highly unlikely that the number of law and economics articles has
actually declined. The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
began publishing in 1985 and the International  Review of Law and
Economics increased from two to three issues per year in 1990. Both
journals are likely to have drawn some economic articles away from
law reviews. Third, one cannot say much about the total  number of
law and economics articles published from a sample limited to five
law reviews.
29 This assumes that the five law reviews are roughly representative of the
universe of law reviews. We suspect that they are not and that the bias works
against citations to economists by noneconomically minded lawyers. Being
among the most prestigious, the law reviews that we surveyed tend to set the
fashion and hence attract interdisciplinary work, implying diminished will-
ingness (about which more later) to publish conventional doctrinal scholar-
ship.
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TABLE 3
TYPES OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN LEADING
LAW
REVIEWS,  1976 - 1990
Trpe of Article 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90
I
Econ. 11.5 % 20.0 % 18.7 %
Doctrinal 58.8 40.1 34.2
Other 29.8 39.9 47.2
I I n=410 I n= 461 I n = 520
n = number of principal  articles in that year in the surveyed journals.
We excluded student articles (“notes” or “comments”),  along with
such ephemera as dedications  and memorial addresses.
We also tabulated the number of footnotes and citations by type
of article for selected years (1975, 1980,1985, and 1988). Our sam-
ple of doctrinal articles turns out to have about 20 percent more ci-
tations to articles and books than “other” articles do, while the eco-
nomic articles are at the low end in number of citations? This
shows that the growth in citations to economic articles is not the
result simply of more citations per article in the economic and
“other” categories than in the doctrinal category.
In light of the suggestions by Horwitz, Fiss, and Ellickson that
law and economics may have peaked, as well as the results in Table
3 (and the disaggregated data underlying that table), an important
question is whether the rate of growth of citations to the economists
in OUT sampZe peaked or slowed over the period studied. The ques-
tion is easy to investigate because the major law schools already had
economists on their faculties by 1985 and were unlikely to add
3o For the years 1980, 1985. and 1988, the average number of references
in the five law reviews was 128 per article for doctrinal articles, 83 for law and
economics  articles, and 106 for all other categories or article. In contrast,  the
Journal of Law and Economics and the Journal of Legal Studies averaged 37
references  per article in the same three years.
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others (as opposed to persons with the joint degree), so that the
sample hasn’t changed much in the recent period-indeed, of the
13 economists in our sample, 11 were law school faculty memberseconomists  in our sa ple, 11  l f r
by 1983. We tested for a diminution in the impact of economics in 
law journals in several ways. First, we replaced T in equation (4)
with two time variables that divide the sample period in half: Tl,
which runs from 1976 to 1982, and T2, which runs from 1983 to
1990. The coefficient of TJ measures the annual rate of growth of
citations (holding experience constant) in the earlier period and the
coefficient of T2 measures the growth in the later period. The re-
gression coefficients (and t-statistics) in the law journal category are
.231 (2.39) and .204 (4.19) on Tl and T2 respectively, indicating a
slightly higher (but not statistically signficant) growth in the earlier
period. But since the growth in the latter period is positive and
highly significant, the hypothesis that law and economics has
peaked (which implies a negative or zero regression coefficient for
T2) is not supported.
We experimented with two other ways to divide the time vari-
able. One has T3 run from 1976 to 1985 and T4 from 1986 to
1990; the other hasT5 run from 1976 to 1987 and T6 from 1988 to
1990. This procedure enables us to test for a peak or slowdown  be-
ginning in 1986 or 1988. The regression  coefficients (and t-sstatis-
tics) for the law journal category are .268 (4.14) for TJ and .206
(4.60) forT4, and .250 (4.69) and .187 (4.22) for Ts and T6. Again
we observe positive and statistically  significant  growth rates in both
the earlier  and later time periods; the 6 percent slower growth in
the later periods  is not statistically  significant.31 Notice that the rate
of growth in the later periods (either 1986 to 1990, or 1988 to
1990) is high (around 20 percent) and of the same magnitude as
the growth rate for the entire period in Table 2.
31 The computed  F-statistics (with 1 and 185 degrees  of freedom) for
testing a slowdown  in the growth rates for the earlier and later periods are
2.352 for T3 and T4, and 3.315 for Ts and T6. These numbers are below 3.90,
the critical value for the F-statistic  at the 95 percent level of confidence.  If the
computed F-statistic exceeded 3.90, we would reject  the null hypothesis that-
the growth rates are equal in the earlier and later periods.
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Another hypothesis we dub the “Epstein Effect.” One might
have expected that when Richard Epstein, an early critic of the
economic approach to law, replaced Richard Posner as editor of the
Journal of Legal Studies in 1983 (actually 1982, but we use 1983 be-
cause the articles published in 1982 had been accepted under
Posner’s editorship), the composition of articles would shift away
from law and economics. A derivative effect would be a shift in the
composition of the citations in the journal. To test the second ef-
fect we added a dummy variable (1 after 1983 and 0 before) to a re-
gression equation limited to citations in the two law and economics
journals. We find no Epstein Effect. (The explanation may be his
“conversion” of which we spoke earlier.) The coefficient on the
dummy variable is slightly positive but not statistically significantly
different from zero.32
The regression equations in Table 2 explain no more than a
third of the variation in citations among economists. This is cause
neither for surprise nor for alarm. Quality differences unobservable
by our methodology doubtless account for a great deal of variability
in citations among economists with similar levels of experience.
Two of the economists in our sample who have nearly identical ex-
perience levels have 140 and 1701 citations respectively.33 Still, the
fact that the experience and time variables are highly significant
statistically provides strong support for the proposition that eco-
nomics has had a growing influence on legal scholarship (and see
note 22).
The Joint Degrees. Compared to the economists, our sample of
law professors with joint degrees has less teaching and research ex-
perience (8.6 years, compared to the economists’ 19.4 total years and
32 The regression coefficient is .008 and the t-ratio is .02. The regres-
sion equation for law and economics journals is not presented in Table 2,
which distinguishes only between citations in law journals and in economic
journals. Citations in law and economics journals are part of the "total” cate-
gory (the third column).
33 The human capital literature  yields a similar picture:
tions, in which  individual earnings are regressed on experie
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10.1 years of law school experience)? So one is not surprised that
Table 4 shows that over the entire 1976-1990 period persons with
joint degrees were cited much less frequently on average than
economists: ’ 211 (2113/10) versus 632 (8220/13). If we disregard
 citations in the 1976-1980 period because 6 of the 10 individuals in
the joint degree sample were still students then, the fraction of cita-
tions to the sample that appeared in law journals remained roughly
constant at about 80 percent (of all citations to them) from 1981 to
1990. This is higher than the corresponding figure for the “pure”
economists: 50 percent. One possible explanation, which is sup-
ported by our earlier findings concerning lawyer-economist teams,
is that the law school education of the joint-degree scholars enables
them to communicate more effectively than the pure economists
with lawyers. Another possibility is that education channels them
toward issues of greater interest to lawyers. The fact that their cita-
tions in law journals have remained relatively constant over the
1981 to 1990 period- u n l i k e the case of the pure economists,
whose share of law citations increased between 1976 and 1990-
may reflect the fact that the joint-degree scholars have specialized
in law and economics for their entire academic career.
TABLE 4
CITATIONS TO JOINT DEGREES,  1976 - 1990
Citations 1 1976-1980 1 1981-1985 1 1986-1990







133 I 479 I 1120
no. teaching $4 6 10
34 The sample  consis ts  of  Ayres ,  Bebchuk,  Donohue,  Hansmann,
Hylton, Kaplow, Kornhauser, Levmore, Markovits, and Sykes.
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Although Table 4 shows that the citations to this group in-
creased tenfold during the sample period, we must be cautious about
drawing any strong inferences regarding the growth of the
influence of economics on law. Most of the “joint degrees” are re-
cent appointments and hence have a limited stock of publications.
Rather than estimate regression equations for this sample alone
(since most of their publications are within the past five years) we
combined the “joint degrees” and economists and added the variable
D which takes the value one for persons with “joint degrees” and
zero for economists. Table 5 presents our regression estimates.35
Consistent with our findings for the pure economists, both ex-
perience variables have the predicted sign and are highly significant
in all regressions. Citations increase with experience (assuming no
increase in demand with time) up to about 11 to 18 years and de-
cline thereafter. If allowance is made for the growth in citations as
a function of time, the peak is after 16 to 29 years of experience. As
with the regressions for economists only, the highest peak year is
for citations in law journals. The annual percentage growth rates
for all categories are positive and significant and of comparable
magnitude to the economists-only sample.
The combined sample, however, yields evidence not of a peak
(i.e., followed by a decline), but of a slowing of the rate of growth,
of economics in law when we split the time variable into two peri-
ods. The regression coefficients (and t--ratios) in the law journal
category are .181 (2.36) and ,184 (5.21) for Tl and T2; .272 (5.49)
and .203 (6.37) for T3 and T4; and .256 (6.51) and .18S (6.02) for
Ts and T6. The differences between T,J and T4; (splitting the
sample at 1985/1986), and Ts and T6 (splitting the sample at
1987/1988) are statistically  significant  at the 95 percent confidence
level.
35 There are 80 observations  for the “joint  degrees,” so each regression
contains 270 observations: 190 economist observations plus 80 joint degree
observations.
























,YSIS OF CITATIONS TO
bND JOINT DEGREES
Econ. 1 Total
b t-ratio b t-ratio
,338 (5.92) .345 646)
-.OlS (-6.51) 0.012 (-5.66)
.160 (6.09) .145 (5.90)
-22.545 (-10.47) 0.269 (-1.18)
R2 = e45 R2 = .31
n= 270 I n = 270
Notes:  (1) R2 = adjusted coefficient of variation
(2) n= number of observations
(3) Citations  in the two law and economics journals are
included  in the “total” category onlv.
Recall that Tables 1 and 4 show that the “joint degrees” have
fewer citations than the “pure” economists. But since they entered
teaching more recently, it is unclear whether this is a consequence
of less experience (and hence fewer publications) or lower quality.
The regression coefficients of Dl bear on this question. With ex-
perience held constant, the “joint degrees” have about double the
number of citations in law journals as the “pure” economists,
significantly fewer citations in economic journals, and about the
same number overall (i.e., the coefficient of D1 is not significant in
the “total” regression). Consistent with our earlier discussion, the
work of the “joint. degrees” appears to be more accessible to lawyers
and therefore more likely to be cited by them, but less interesting to
economists.
The fact that the average experience of the joint-degree scholars
is probably less than that of other members of law faculties suggests
an increasing receptivity to economics at law schools. For if the
younger cohorts of a profession have a larger percentage of a given
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type of scholar than the older ones, over time the profession as a
whole will probably have a larger percentage of that type.
” The Founders.  ” Table 6 presents citations to the so--called
“founders” of law and economics.36 In keeping with our earlier ta-
bles that separate economists from lawyers, we separate Coase from
the three lawyers in the “founders” sample.
Come. Coase’s citations follow an atypical pattern. Although he
is past 80, and (while still productive) has not written a heavily cited
paper for some years, a human capital regression on Coase alone has
the wrong s i g n s -negative on Y and positive on P, indicating that
his work may be appreciating rather than depreciating.37 The share
of citations to that work in law journals has, as in the case of the
economists in our first sample, been increasing, from 33.9 percent
in 1976-1980 to 34.2 percent in 1981-1985 and to 40.7 percent in
1986-1990. This reinforces our suggestion that economics can be
seen to be gaining strength at law schools because the rate of
increase in the number of citations to economists is more rapid in
law journals than in either economics journals or law and eco-
nomics journals-the latter two categories controlling for experi-
ence. Notice that the increase in citations to Coase can’t be at-
tributed to his specializing in “law and economics,” for his most
cited works lie more than 30 years in the past and he has had a law
school appointment since the early 1960s.
36 This was the term used at the inaugural session of the American Law
and Economics Association. We do not vouch for its accuracy. “Founder”
Posner had nothing to do with the organization of the association or the
planning of its inaugural session. A weakness in the “founder” sample is that
both Calabresi and Posner have written noneconomic works that are cited; but
in the case of Posner, at least, most readers believe that his unoneconomicn
writin is saturated with economics.
3 9 Such a regression does not adjust for the growth in demand because
one cannot separate the effects of experience from time for a regression on a
single individual.
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TABLE 6


























Calabresi, Mame, Posner.  This group has more citations than
the 13 economists plus the 10 joint-degree scholars; the group plus
Coase (that is, the four “founders” together) have roughly 50 per-
cent more citations than these other 23 scholars in our samples.
Part of this difference results from the greater average experience of
the “founders,” but part no doubt results from their greater promi-
nence (i.e., their higher “quality” adjusted capital stock). The frac-
tion of citations to Calabresi, Manne, and Posner that appear in
law journals has been essentially constant since 1976 (76 percent in
19764980, 73.5 percent in 19814985, 78.8 percent in 19860
1990). By our earlier analysis, this constancy is evidence against the
hypothesis of a growing influence of economics on law, but the
fraction was already so high in 1976-1980 that the room for further
growth was limited.
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TABLE 7
REGRESSION ANALYSIS  OF CITATIONS TO
1 ECONOMISTS,  JOINT DEGREES, AND
FOUNDERS
Inde- Law Econ. Total
pendent  b t-ratio b t-ratio b t-ratio
Variable
Y ,313 (5.03) .339 (6.42) .345 (6.98)
P -.008 (-3.32) -.OlS (-6.90) -.012 (-6.05)
y(fl 0.242 (-3.05) 0.206 (-3.04) 0.222 (-3.51)
voF3 2 .003 (2.47) .003 (3.18) .003 (3.15)
T . 173 (6.92) 0138 (6.49) .136 (6.83)
D1 1.241 (4.81) -2.452 (-11.17) 0.229 (-1.12)
D2 9.sso (7.81) 5.776 (5.55) 7.614 (7.83)
R 2 = 0 51 R 2= 55
n= SjO
R2, . 48
n= 330 n =330
Nom:( 1) R2 = adjusted coefficient of variation
(2) n= number of observations
(3) Citations  in the two law and economics journals are
included in the 9ota.l”  category only.
Table 7 presents a regression analysis that combines the
economists, the joint degrees, and the founders. Because the rela-
tion between citations and experience for the founders is atypical,




DI, which takes the
by ycf) and Y@)2, and
value 1 for joint degrees
tW0
and
0 otherwise; and -D2, which takes the value 1 for founders and 0
othetise. ,
The coefficients of the experience variables for the founders
have the “wrong” signs: they imply that citations decline with ex-
perience at a decreasing rate until about 43 years of experience, and
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appreciate thereafter. 38 Because the founders already had an average
experience of 22.3 years in 1976, they have a relatively flat expe-
rience-citation profile for the later part of our sample period. Dif-
ferently stated, the influence of the “founder” group appears to be
greater than that of the other groups as measured both by the
greater number of citations they receive on average (the coefficients
on 02 are positive and significant) and by the durability of their ci-
tations. A possible explanation is that the work of the founders is
more fundamental, hence more general, and the generality of an
intellectual contribution is associated with a greater longevity of the
contribution,39 because general work is more adaptable to changed
conditions. The pure economists and the joint degrees tend to
focus on narrower, more technical problems. A more important
reason, however, for the durability of the founders’ work is that the
pioneers in a discipline often cover more ground, albeit in less
depth, than the scholars who come after them. This is another
reason for expecting the founders’ work to be more general. That
doesn’t mean that it’s of higher quality; but our concern in this pa-
per is with questions of influence rather than questions of quality.
The regression coefficients on the time variable in Table 7 indi-
cate that citations in law journals to all the law and economics
scholars in our three samples have increased at an annual rate of 17
38 The reason for the “wrong” signs is that Posner has on average 19
years less experience, but substantially more citations per year, than the other
three “founders.” Since the regression computes the founders’ citation-experi-
ence profile from just four individuals, the fact that the Ufounder” with the
least experience has the most citations tends to impart a spurious negative re-
lationship between citations and experience, even though the pattern of cita-
tions for each founder separately suggests that citations increase, then even-
tually flatten out or decline (except for Coase), as experience accumulates. We
tested for this by in&ding in the regression a variable that takes the value 1
for Posner and 0 otherwise. When this is done, the coefficients on experience
and experience-squared for the founders become statistically insignificant.
Notice that a UPosner type problem” arises only in small samples, where one
or two individuals can alter the typical citation-experience profile.
39 As found with respect to precedents in Landes and Posner, note 11
above. See also Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood
Relation 74-76 (1988).
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percent, which is slightly lower, but not significantly so, than for
the narrower samples. Again, when, we split the time variable into
TJ and T2 we find no significant difference in rate of growth of
citations before and after 1983,  However, when we substitute ei-
ther T,J and T4 or Ts and T6, we find a statistically significant
higher growth rate in the earlier period (T3 and T4 but still a
growth rate in excess of 17 percent for the later period (Ts and
T6).40 Finally, Table 7 indicates that the annual rate of increase of
citations in economic (and other non-law) journals has been about
14 percent.
Comparisons to Other Lega/ Scholars
We now compare our aggregate sample of law and economics
scholars to other legal scholars, beginning with 25 law professors
who practice legal doctrinal scholarship and following with several
groups of interdisciplinary scholars. One combines law, philosophy,
and political theory; we call this the “political theory” group. Others
are the two main “antiestablishment” groups in academic law-
feminism and critical legal studies. 41 Because of overlap between the
political theorists and the antiestablishmentarians, we also present
results for a combined sample of both groups-the “theorists,” we
call them. None of the scholars in the various groups examined in
this section was selected randomly, because of the difficulty of
designing a manageable method of sampling them randomly. In-
stead, we selected prominent scholars having different amounts of
experience. But we selected them before counting their citations.
Doctrinal  Sdolars. Traditional legal scholars study legal doc-
trines using methods of legal analysis essentially unsullied by other
fields such as economics, philosophy, or feminist theory. Our sam-
ple consists of prominent living doctrinal scholars at the fifteen
4o The regression coefficients (and t-statistics)  for the various time vari-
ables in the law category are as follows: .I46 (2.63) and .171 (6.00) for Tl and
7”; .246 (6.09) and .187 (7.32) for 3 and T4; and .233 (7.30) and .171 (6.94)T
for Ts and T6*
41 A third 9 critical  race studies 9 is too recent to be studied by citation
analysis.
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leading law schools, except that we also include Prosser (who is
dead) because his textbook continues to be used widely. Our sample
is neither a complete count of doctrinal scholars at these law
schools (even assuming one could agree on whom to classify as a
doctrinal scholar) nor even a random sample of these doctrinal
scholars. 42 But it covers a wide variety of subject matter areas and a
wide range of ages and includes law professors such as Gerald
Gunther and John Hart Ely who have written some of the most
widely cited law review articles,43 together with prominent younger
scholars such as Lee Brilmayer and Richard Fallon. The teaching
experience of individuals in this sample (as of 1990) ranged from 8
years to more than 40, with the average being 26 (24 excluding
Prosser) 44 The average is greater than that of either the economistsl
or the “joint degrees” but less than that of the “founders.” The fact
that the experience of the doctrinal sample is greater than that of
the economists and joint degrees is consistent with the widespread
42 One factor preventing a complete count is that we exclude persons with
common last names (e.g., Jones) and persons with uncommon names who
share the same name as other law professors (e.g., Meltzer at Chicago and
Meltzer at Harvard). We follow this procedure because many citations in law
journals are to last name only and are so recorded in SSCI.
43 For example Gunther’s article The Supreme Court 1971 Term-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harvard Law Review 1 (1972), ranked as the
most cited law review article through March 1985. Fred R. Shapiro, The
Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 California Law Review 1540 (1985).
Shapiro’s rankings are based on a citation count in Shepads Law Review
Citations, which exclude interdisciplinary journals and thus exclude Coase’s
article on social cost, published in the Journal of Law and Economics. Our
sample also includes Lawrence Tribe, whose treatise on constitutional law was
cited more than 900 times in the SSCI in the period 19864990.
44 It may seem -odd to keep counting years of experience after a person is
dead, as we do with Prosser, but it isn’t really, because number of years since
first teaching appointment is merely our method of approximating the depre-
ciation-adjusted stock of a scholar’s publications. Obviously a scholar’s
inAuence  frequently outlasts his death and it would be arbitrary to truncate our
sample at death. An additional factor in the case of Prosser is that new edi-
tions of his famous textbook on torts continue to be published under his
name, even though in each successive edition a larger fraction of the book is
written by the living editors.
32 CHICAGO WORKING  PAPER IN LAW & ECONOMICS
belief that doctrinal analysis holds less appeal for younger faculty
members’at  law schools. But little Iweight can be assigned to this
finding, because we did not use a random method to select the
doctrinalists  for OF sample. l
TABLE 8
CITATIONS TO DOCTRINALSCHOLARS,  1976 - 1990
Citations 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990Ir
Total 8081 10593 10885
Law 7488 9770 10020
Other 593 823 865 \
I no. teaching I 24 I 25 I 25 I
As expected, law journals account for most of the citations to
the doctrinalists’ sample-92 percent. This is considerably higher
than the 76 to 80 percent for both the founders and joint degrees
samples, and a great deal higher than the 26 to 55 percent figures
for the pure-economists sample. Citations to the doctrinal sample
increase more slowly than citations to the economic samples. Part
of the explanation is that the average experience of the doctrinal
sample is greater, and we know that intellectual capital tends to in-
crease more rapidly in the early stages of one’s academic career. But
experience alone cannot be the only factor at work. The “founders”
had an average experience of 36 years in 1990 (29 years excluding
Coase) compared to only 26 years for the doctrinal sample, yet the
founders’ citations increased far more rapidly: by 97 percent, com-,
pared to 35 percent for the doctrinalists, over the 1976 to 19.90 pe-
riod for total citations; and by 109 percent, compared to 34 percent,
for citations in law journals. A comparison of Tables 1, 4, and 6
with Table 8 thus suggests an increase in the infIuence of eco-
nomics on law relative to the influence of doctrinal analysis on law
between 1976 and 1990.
A similar conclusion emerges when the three time periods are
examined separately. Citations in law journals to the founders in-
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creased by 65 percent, compared to 30.5 percent for the doctrinal-
ists, between 19764980 and 1981-1985, and by 27 percent com-
pared to less< than 3 percent between the 19814985 and 1986-1990
periods. The lower rate of increase for both samples in the more re-
cent period no doubt reflects the effect of higher levels of experi-
ence in slowing down the rate of increase of citations.
TABLE  9
REGRESSION  ANALYSIS  OF
DOCTRINAL  SAMPLE
Independent Law Other.
Variable b t-ratio b t-ratio
Y 127 (5.76) 35 (4.15)
P -iOl (-3.69) 0.001 (-1.56)
T ,009 (0.50) ,004 (0.16)
R2 = .18 R2 = .18
n = 365 n = 365
N&s: (I) R2 equals adjusted  coefficient of variation.
(2) n= number of observations.
Regression analysis supports the hypothesis that economic
analysis of law has grown in influence relative to doctrinal analysis.
Indeed, the regression coefficients on the time variable in Table 9
indicate that there has been virtually no growth (1 percent or less)
in the demand for doctrinal analysis over the past 15 years, holding
experience constant. We also divided time into Tl and T2 to test
whether the rate of growth of citations differed before and after
1983. Although the coefficients on both time variables are positive
(.048 for Tl and .0187 for TJ), neither is statistically significant.
Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis of zero growth for doctrinal
analysis over the entire 1976 to 1990 period.45
45 We considered expanding the doctrinal sample by adding past presi-
dents of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) from 19764990.
Unfortunately, we were able to count the citations of only seven of them be-
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An important qualification must be noted, however. Recall that
Table 3 records a sharp decline in the fraction of doctrinal articles
in five leading law reviews. This suggests that we should have ob-
served a negative rather than a zero growth rate of doctrinal cita-
tions in the regression analysis. The fact that citations to our doc-
trinal sample have remained about constant over time may indicate
that a sample of elite law reviews overstates the downward trend to
doctrinal scholarship. A broader sample of law reviews might show
little decline in the fraction of doctrinal articles, implying that not
so much the (relative) quantity as the prestige of doctrinal scholar-
ship was declining. This would still be an important datum.
As in our prior regressions, experience and experience squared
have the predicted effects and are statistically significant in Table 9
(except for y2 in the “other” category). One interesting difference
between the economist and joint degree samples on the one hand
and the doctrinal sample on the other is that the experience-cita-
tion profile is flatter for the latter group. Although citations in law
journals to the pure economists and to the joint degrees initially
increase more rapidly than citations to the doctrinalists at earlier
years of experience (.312 in Table 5 compared to ,127 in Table 9),
depreciation also appears to be more rapid (-.009 in Table 5 com-
pared to -.OOl in Table 9 for Y2). The net effect is that citations
peak later for the doctrinal group-45 years, compared to 18 to 29
years depending on whether we allow for the growth in demand
for citations to the economists and the joint degree scholars. The
difference in peak years, however, is largely due to the inclusion of
Prosser in our doctrinal group. If Prosser is excluded, the regression
coefficients (and t-ratios) on Y and Y2 are .265 (8.58) and 0.006
(-7.47) respectively, which yield a peak citation value at 24 years of
experience; and the coefficient on time in the law-journal category
cause eight had last names that were too common. The presidents we counted
averaged fewer than 15 citations per year per person compared to about 80 per
year for the scholars in our 25 person doctrinal sample. This suggests that the
presidents were selected for reasons other than scholarship. We decided
against including them in the analysis because we are studying the influence
of scholarship.
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increases to .027 (indicating about a 3 percent growth per year)-
but the coefficient is not statistically significant, the t-ratio being
onlyl.4.
Law, PoZiticaZ.  Tbeoy, and Philosophy. We also examined the
citations to a group of seven distinguished legal scholars (the
“political theorists”) who have integrated philosophy and political
theory explicitly into their legal writings.46 Their mean experience
is 30.4 years (25 years without Lon Fuller). The range is from 9
years (Sunstein) to 64 years (Fuller). Tables 10 and 11 present a ci-
tation count and regression results for this sample.
TABLE IO
I I CITATIONS TO “POLITICAL THEORISTS,” 1976-1990
Citations 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990r II 1
Total 4512 6670 10006
Law 3510 5186 8258
Other 1002 1484 1748 \
I no. teaching I 6 I 7 I 7 I
Table 10 confirms the view that these scholars are highly
influential. Their total citations are about 30 percent greater than
the citations to the “founders” (the founders’ sample, however, is
smaller) and are about 70 percent of the citations to the entire
doctrinal sample, even though the latter sample is more than three
times larger than the political-theory sample. Indeed, for the sub-
period 1986-1990, the doctrinal and political-theory samples have
about the same number of citations. Table 10 confirms that these
scholars are correctly classified as “interdisciplinary,” for about 20
percent of the citations to them are found in non-law journals,
compared to 8 percent for the doctrinal group.
46 Ackerman9 Dworkin 9 Fiss9 Fuller, Hart, Michelman, and Sunstein.
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TABLE II
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL
THEORY SAMPLE
Independent Law Other
Variable b t-ratio b t-ratio
Y .115 (10.45) .201 (9.17)
I? a.002 (-9.36) -.003 (-7.87)
T li .058 (5.59) -.005 (-0.22)
R2 = .64 R2 = .51
n = 99 n = 99
Notes: (1) R2 equals adjusted coefficient of variation.
(2) n= number of observations.
Experience and experience squared have the predicted effects
and are highly significant (Table 11). Citations peak after 37 to 40
years of experience, considerably later than for our sample of “pure”
economists and “joint degrees.” The difference is not surprising. No
one doubts that economics is a progressive discipline, but there is a
substantial doubt whether the same can be said about moral philos-
ophy and political theory. For the most part (though both
Ackerman and Sunstein use some economics in their work), the
tools of analysis employed in the latter disciplines are little changed
from the days of Plato and Aristotle. Studies of citation “half
lives”47 consistently find them to be shorter in the sciences than in
the humanities, and while law and economics lies at the scientific
end of law, philosophy and political theory lie near the humanities
end of law.
Table 11 reveals a 6 percent annual increase in law-journal cita-
tions to the work of the political-theory group in comparison to the
17 to 20 percent increases we estimated for various samples of law
and economics scholars. This is further support for the growing
47 The number of years between a cited publication and the present that
are needed to account for half the citations to the publication.
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influence of economic analysis of law relative to other types of legal
scholarship. And notice the zero growth in demand for citations to
our political-theorist group in non-law journals (the “other” class in
Table 11). The positive growth in law journals is consistent with
our earlier finding that the balance in legal scholarship is shifting
from doctrinal to interdisciplinary work, but combined with the
zero growth in other journals has an additional significance as
well 48 The regression equations for the law and economics scholarsl
. consistently showed a significant increase in demand not only in
law journals but also in economics (and other) journals for citations
to these scholars. Indeed, demand increased in economics journals
by about 14 to 16 percent annually (see Tables 5 and 7).49 This
suggests that the rapid growth of economics in law is a product not
just of a shift by legal scholars from doctrinal toward in-
terdisciplinary legal scholarship, but also or instead of improvements
in the scholarship of law and economics that has made that schol-
arship increasingly valuable to the social-sciences community in
general. In contrast, the positive growth in citations to the politi-
cal-theory sample appears to reflect a change in preferences by legal
scholars rather than any improvements in political theory.
. hztiestabZisbment.  Tables 12 and 13 present our results for
feminist legal theory and critical legal studies (CLS). These fields
make heavy use of radical thought from nonlegal areas of scholar-
ship, such as Marxist political theory, deconstruction, structuralism,
and radical feminism, and are on the whole disdainful of doctrinal
scholarship, regarding it as no better than rationalization and
mystification. CLS began about 1972; there was very little feminist
legal theory before 1980. The CLS sample includes the three gen-
48 If we exclude Hart and Fuller, representatives of an earlier generation,
from our political-theorist group, the coefficients on time shows a slightly
higher growth rate in law journals (10 percent, compared to 6 percent in
Table 11) but no significant growth in the "othern categories. Thus, the infer-
ences we draw from the larger and from the smaller sample are the same .
49 For the economist-only sample, the increase in demand was only 12
percent in economic journals, but we explained this by the growing special-
ization of these economists in law.
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erally recognized founders of the movement-Duncan Kennedy,
Morton How&z, and Roberto Unger, all Harvard Law School
professors. 50 The sample of feminists includes Catharine Mc-
Kinnon, the recognized founder and most prominent figure in
legal feminism, together with several other well-known feminist
legal thinkerssl
TABLE  12
CITATIONS  TO CRITICAL  LEGAL STUDIES AND
FEMINIST  LEGAL THEORY,  1976 - 1990
Citations 19764980 19814985 19864990
CLS
Total 964 3532 5170
Law 797 3099 4405
Other 167 433 765
no. teaching 8 9 9
Feminist
Total 26 399 2480
Law 16 290 1962
Other 10 109 518
no. teaching 3 6 6
Table 12 reveals rates of growth of citations to both samples
that are equal to or greater than that of law and economics, though
this is misleading because the very high feminist growth rate is due
in part to limited experience. Only three of the scholars in our
feminist sample were in teaching during the 19764980 period and
only one for the full period. As before, regression analysis enables US
to separate the effect of experience from that of demand. The re-
gression coefficients on experience and experience squared in Table
13 yield the predicted effects and are statistically significant in all
5o The others in our CLS sample are Frug, Gabel, Kelman, Peller,
Schlegel, and Tushnet.
si Becker, Minow, Olsen, Radin, and West.
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equations. In both the CLS and the feminist samples, citations
peak in law journals at 12 to 14 years (holding growth in demand
constant), which is lower than for most of the other samples we
have investigated, including the economics samples-suggesting
rather implausibly that CLS and feminist legal theory are more
“scientific” than economic analysis of law.
TABLE 13
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CITATIONS TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES AND FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
Critical Legal Studies Feminist  Legal Theory
Independen Law Other Law Other
t Variable b f-rafio  b f-rat& b f-rafio  b f-ratio
Y .634 (6.27) .567 (4.80) .959 (5.46) .718 (2.99)
Y2 0.023 (-4.98) -.015 (-2.79) 0.039 (-3.61) 0.025 (-1.72)
T .131 (3.15) .019 (0.39) .158 (2.42) .065 (0.73)
R2 =.50 R2- 43 R2. =.74 R2,- .45
n= 126 n= 126 n = 68 n = 68
N&x (1) R2 equals  adjusted coefficient  of variation.
(2) n= number of observations.
Both samples show significant increases in demand over time
(holding experience constant) in law journals-citations to CLS
increase by 13 percent per year and to feminist legal theory by 16
percent. The former is smaller than the increase for law and eco-
nomics scholars (see Table 7); the latter is about the same. Neither
sample, however, exhibits increases in demand outside of law jour-
nals. Although the regression coefficients on the time variable for
the “other” category are positive for both samples, neither is statisti-
cally significant. In short, the increase in demand for this work
within law appears to reflect a shift toward interdisciplinary studies
within law rather than a general growth in demand for this work
outside of law. This parallels our finding for the political-theory
sample.
40 CHICAGO  WORKING PAPER IN LAW 8t ECONOMICS
We also estimated regressions for both the critical legal studies
and feminist samples in which the time variable was split into two
periods. For critical legal studies, the growth rates in the later period
ranged between I2 and 14 percent in law journals; the correspond-
ing figures for feminists are I4 and 19 percent. In neither case was
there a statistically significant increase in the rate of growth be-
tween the two periods. We also estimated a regression for the
feminist sample limited to the period since 1981 because there were
very few citations to feminist work before then. The results were
comparable to the complete sample. For example, the regression
coefficients (and t-ratios) for time were .154 (2.14)  and .045 (0.38)
for the law-journal and other categories respectively.
TABLE 14
REGRESSION  ANALYSIS  OF




















Notes: (1) R2 equals adjusted coefficient of variation.
(2) n= number of observations.
There is a fair degree of overlap among our three noneconomic
interdisciplinary fields: political theory, CLS, and feminist legal
theory. Some members of the political-theory group, notably Fiss,
Michelman, and Sunstein, are highly sympathetic to one or both of
the other two subdisciplines. And both CLS and feminist legal
theory draw on deconstruction, structuralism, and Marxist political
theory. We therefore combine the three groups in Table 14, omit-
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ting Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart, whose active professional lives
preceded CLS and feminist legal theory. For this. aggregated
“theory” sample, we find a growth rate in citations in law journals
that is somewhat lower than in the economics samples (7 percent
versus 17 percent) and no significant growth outside law journals.
To all these comparisons it can be objected that we are confus-
ing growth in influence with influence per se, and that a compari-
son of levels of citations shows to the distinct advantage of the po-
litical theorists, and even of the critical and feminist legal scholars.
In the period 1986-1990,  for example, the average number of cita-
tions to the political theorists is 1429, to the feminists a shade over
400 (and about the same for the doctrinalists), and to the critical le-
gal scholars 574, whereas the corresponding figures for the pure
economists is only 309 and for the joint degrees a pitiable 140. But
these comparisons are inapt. The economist and joint degree
“samples” were in fact to entire populations, selected without regard
to prominence, whereas the comparison samples were to prominent
representatives of the various schools of thought. For example, if we
limit the economist sample to the five most heavily cited (which
would make it more comparable to the noneconomic samples), the
average number of citations is 545 for the 1986-1990 period, which
is greater than the feminist sample though less than the critical le-
gal studies sample. An even better comparison might be with the
“founders” of law and economics. Their average citations in the
1986-1990 period are 1624-the highest of any sample. A point of
particular relevance to the joint degree sample is that if a field is
growing because of its perceived influence, it will tend to have a
higher percentage of young people in it than a static or declining
field, and young people have fewer citations if no correction is made
for experience. Hence a simple comparison of levels of citations can
create a misleading impression with regard to the relative influence
of a field.
.
Citation Analysis of Journals
An alternative to comparing individual scholars or groups of
scholars is to compare journals. The oldest and best-known journals
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specializing in economic analysis of law are the Journal of Law and
Economics, founded by Aaron Director in 1958, and the Journal of
Legal Studies, founded by Richard Posner in 1972. We compare
citations to these journals with citations to other interdisciplinary
law journals, to student-edited law journals, and to economic jour-
nals.
Our source of data is ISI’s Journal Citation Reports, a compan-
ion volume to the Social Science Citations Index (what we are call-
ing SSCI, though technically JCR is one publication of the SSCI
and the Citations Index itself is another), available from 1977
through 1988. JCR uses the same data base as SSCI (1300 journals
in all areas of social science) but counts citations to the surveyed
journals themselves, whereas SSCI counts citations in those jour-
nals regardless of whether the cited work appeared in one of the
journals 52 (So you can look up citations to, Aristotle in SSCI al-
though Aristotle never had the good fortune to write an article in a
journal surveyed by the SSCI-not even in the Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society.) In 1988 the SSCI data base (upon which, to
repeat, JCR draws) contained 110 surveyed law journals (including
interdisciplinary law journals), down from about 130 in 1977. Why
the decline? ISI, the compiler of the data base and publisher of
both volumes, drops or adds journals on the basis of the number of
times a journal is cited. Journals rarely cited by other journals are
dropped, while those that are cited frequently are added-so there is
a bias against new journals, since they haven’t had time to be cited a
lot. Both the Buffalo and University of Detroit law journals have
been dropped, while the Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, which began publishing in 1985, was recently added
though not in time for our study. JLE and JLS have been surveyed
since the beginning. JCR surveys about 20 other interdisciplinary
law journals, but the remaining two law and economics journals,
the International Review of Law and Economics  and Research in
Law and Economics, are not among them.
52 For a complete description of JCR’s methodology, see Introduction to
1988 SSCI Journal Citation Reports 5a.
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A problem with ranking journals by the number of times they
are cited is ‘that a journal that has been publishing for a longer pe-
riod of time, or that publishes more articles per year, will, other
things being equal, be cited more than a younger or smaller journal,
simply because the older and larger one has a greater stock of articles
to be cited. We need something akin to the correction for experi-
ence that we made in evaluating individual scholars. JCR’s  authors
are aware of the problem and publish several statistics that adjust for
these differences. One is the “impact factor,” which measures the
number of times the average article in a given journal is cited by di-
viding the total number of citations in the current year to articles
published in the journal in the preceding two years by the number
of articles published in the journal in those years. For example, in
1988 JLS’s impact factor was 2.3, meaning that the average article
published inJLS in 1986 and 1987 received 2.3 citations in journals
surveyed in 1988.
Law and Economics Journats. Table 15 presents citations and
impact factors for JLE and JLS. It shows that both the number of
citations to JLE and JLS and their impact factors have increased
over the 11-year period (19774988) and also that an increasing
fraction of both JLE and JLS citations are in law journals? JLE is
cited more but citations to JLS have risen more rapidly (175 percent
versus 126 percent). Both phenomena may reflect JLE’s greater
age-in 1988 JLS had been published for 16 years, compared to 30
for JLE. It is consistent with this conjecture as to the cause of the
differences in citations that citations rose more rapidly to JLE than
to JLS in the most recent period covered by the study-19814988
(48 versus 33 percent)-by which time JLS had accumulated a
sizable stock of citable articles.
53 Notice that in neither journal is sekitation (here, an article in a
given journal citing another article in the same journal) a major factor.
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TABLE 15
CITATIONS  AND IMPACT  FACTORS  FOR THE
JLE AND THE JLS, 1977-1988
Journal Total Citations  in Law Percent Average
Cita- Journals SelfXi- Impact
tions Number  Percent tations Factor
JLE
1977-80 2036 379 18.6 - 1.17
1981-84 3106. 874 28.1 56 l 1.90
1985-88 4607 956 * 28.3 41 l 2.37
JLS
1977-80 1197 647 54.1 1.90
1981-84 2472 1438 60.0 ii 2.30
1985-88 3295 1409* 60.5 10’0 0 2.34
Notes: *1985-1987 because 1988 data on JLE and JLS citations  in law
journals  are not available.
(1) Percentage of citations in law journals based on 19854987 data.
(2) Self-citation data are available  for 19824988 only.
The two journals differ dramatically in the proportion of cita-
tions to them that appear in law journals: 60 percent for JLS com-
pared to 28 percent for JLE. As a result, JLS is cited about 50 per-
cent more frequently in law journals than JLE even though the
latter is cited substatially more frequently overall. The difference is
related to the growth of the law and economics field. Originally
JLE was the only journal particularly interested in publishing eco-
nomics articles bearing on law, and that is where Landes’s early
work on procedure and Posner’s on torts appeared. By 1972 the
volume of work in law and economics was reaching a level that
would support a second journal. Ronald Coase suggested to Posner
that he start a journal which would specialize in the application of
economics to the legal system, while JLE would focus on particular
areas within the broad domain of law and economics, such as
property rights and antitrust, which were somewhat closer to
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mainline economics. (The overlap is of course considerable.) So it is
not surprising that articles in JLS should be of greater interest on
average to law journals than the articles in JLE. Incidentally the
higher proportion of self-citation in JLS may reflect the fact that
its subject-matter scope is rather narrow, and within that narrow
field its “market share” is larger than JLE’s is in the larger field
(indeed, virtually coterminous with industrial organization) covered
by the latter journal.
Can we infer a growing influence of economics on law from
the growth in the number of citations to these two journals? We
think so. Between 1977 and 1988 the number of law journals sur-
veyed by SSCI declined by about 30 percent. We would expect that
if the influence of the JLE and JLS on law had remained constant
over this period the decline in the number of surveyed law journals
would have caused the number of citations to the two journals to
fall. Against this inference it can be argued that the stock of citable
articles will grow faster for a young journal, and both JLE and
(especially) JLS are relatively young (some law reviews and some
economics journals date from the nineteenth century). But this is
real growth, when (as is the case) no journal is leaving the relevant
market. Had JLE taken the place of another law and economics
journal, the rapid increase in citations to it would be balanced by a
decrease in citations to the former journal when the latter ceased
adding to its stock of citable articles. Only one law and economics
journal has ever ceased publication-the short-lived Supreme Court
Economic Reuiew.54
The fact that the number of citations to JLE and JLS by non-
legal journals grew more slowly than the number of citations to the
two journals by law reviews is further evidence that the increase in
citations to them is not a result purely of the cumulative increase in
their stock of citable material. The likelihood that the average arti-
cle would be cited by a law journal has grown. This is further
shown by the steady growth in impact factors for both journals.
54 “Interrupted” publication might be more
Court Economic Review is about to be revived.
accurate, because the Supreme
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Although the number of citations to student-edited law jour-
nals did not actually decrease despite the reduction in the number of
law journals in the data base, it increased only slightly, with the re-
sult that the combined share of citations to JLE and JLS relative to
citations to the student-edited doubled-from 4.3 percent to 8.9
percent-between 1980 and 1988.55 This is evidence for the
growing influence of economics on law. Another datum from our
JCR study reinforces an earlier point about the unprogressivity of
law as a discipline, compared to economics (including economic
analysis of law): the percentage of citations in the SSCI data base
to law reviews fell between 1980 and 1988 from 6.2 to 4.8 percent.
While it is true that the number of surveyed law reviews also fell,
they fell because so many of them were so little cited. The implica-
tion is that law is a less progressive discipline than the average of all
disciplines covered by the SSCI.
Interdisciplinary Law Journals. Table 16 presents data on the
other interdisciplinary law journals surveyed by the JCR. None
matches either JLE or JLE in number of citations or in impact fac-
tor. Law & Society Review comes closest, having been cited 70 per-
cent as often as JLS during the 1985 to 1988 period. It appears
therefore that as of 1988 the impact of law and economics on law
was greater than that of any other interdisciplinary fields of law as
measured by a comparison of interdisciplinary journals. The two
qualifications in this sentence are important, however. As of 1988
there were no interdisciplinary journals in either law and literature
or feminist jurisprudence; there are now two in the former,
Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature  and the Yale Journal of Law
 the Humanities, and one in the latter, the Yale Journal of Law
and Feminism. Still, no other interdisciplinary field of law has five
journals, as law and economics does.
55 Student-edited law reviews were cited 21,548 times in 1980 and 24,795
times in 1988, although the number of surveyed law reviews fell from 42 to
31. The JLS was cited 296 and 965 times in surveyed journals in- 1980 and
1988 respectively. The corresponding numbers for the JLE are 620 and 1233.
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TABLE 16
CITATIONS AND IMPACT FACTOR FOR
INTERDISCIPLINARY LAW JOURNALS, 19851988
Journal Total Citations Average Impact First Published
Factor
Law & Sot. Rev. 2339 1.46 1966
.J. Crim.. Law 2114 0.35 1910
Law 8c Cont.Pr. 1974 0.87 1933
Phil. & Pub&K 1458 1.52 1971
Ethics 1351 0.75 1890
ABF J. 982 1.76 1976
L. & Hum. Beh. 877 0.99 1977
Med. Sci. & L. 796 0.20 1960
Harv. Civ. Lib.J. 773 2.33 1966
Am. Crim. Law 718 1.57 1962
Int.J.Law Psych. 486 0.48 1978
Am.J.Law Med. 394 0.54 1975
Am.J.Leg.Hist. 390 0.60 1957
Int.J.Soc.Law 300 0.29 1972
J.Leg.Med. 281 0.77 1979
Law & Philo. 144 0.29 1982
J. Law Sot. 117 0.39 1974
Urban Law Pol. 40 0.05 1978
All Average 863 0.85
Notes: (1) All journals  publish 4 times per year except Harv. Civ. Lib. J.
(2 per yr.), Law & Hum. Beh. (24 per yr.), Law & Sot. Rev. (5
per yr.), and Urban Law Pol. (5 per yr.).
(2) J. Law Sot. was surveyed by JCR for the years 1986-1988 only.
(3) The name of the ABF J was changed to Law and Social  Inquiry
in 1988.
The second qualification is that a comparison of interdisci-
plinary journals leaves out conventional law reviews, an important
vehicle of publication for all interdisciplinary fields of law. Critical
Legal Studies has no journal, but it has plenty of articles in conven-
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tional law journals. But of course that is also true of law and eco-
nomics. As the history of the Journal of Legal Studies suggests, the
creation of an interdisciplinary journal is not a random event. It is a
response to an increase in supply and demand, and is therefore evi-
dence for the growth of a field.
TABLE 17
CITATIONS AND IMPACT FACTOR FOR LAW
REVIEWS IN SELECTED  YEARS
Law Reviews 1977 1981 1985 1988
Cites Imp. CiteJmp. Cites Imp. Cites Imp.
Harvard 4705 (13.3) 3765 (6.8) 3842 (6.1) 4423 (8.7)
Yil e 2642 (4.0) 2425 (4.0) 2642 (3.5) 2881 (4.4)
Columbia 1935 (4.7) 1667 (3.3) 1811 (3.4) 2015 (3.1)
Penn 1212 (2.7) 1154 (3.4) 1088 (2.9) 1158 (2.8)
Chicago 1071 (3.9) 968 (3.3) 1033 (2.1) 1161 (3.5)
Berkeley 1033 (2 1)
(2.5)
844 (1.9) 841 (1.4) 924 (1.5)
Stanford 950 938 (1.7) 1216 (5.1) 1381 (2.7)
Virginia 948 (3.3) 786 (1.4) 891 (2.5) 1086 (3.8)
Michigan 934 (2.1) 1074 (2.7) 945 (1.5) 1082 (2.8)
TeXU 730 (1.5) 497 (1.3) 603 (1.9) 807 (3.0)
NYU 717 (2.3) 499 (0.9) 579 (1.1) 616 (2.1)
Cornell 625 (1.8) 584 (2.0) 553 (1.7) 628 (1.8)
Duke 551 (2.5) 408 (1.1) 370 (1.5) 438 (1.7)
Georgetown 472 (1.3) 479 (2.5) 412 (1.2) 419 (1.4)
Northwestern 471 (1.5) 482 (1.4) 420 (1.3) 419 (1.0)
JLE 467 (0.8) 691 (2.1) 1074 (3.6) 1233 (1.5)
JLS 231 (2.0) 588 (3.3) 693 (2.2) 965 (2.3)
Nofes: (1) Law reviews  are listed in descending  order by number of citations
in 1977. .
(2) “Imp.” denotes impact factor.
Law Reviews. Table 17 presents data on the number of cita-
tions and the impact factors for the law reviews of 15 “best” law
INFLUENCE  OF ECONOMICS  ON LAW 4 9
schools. 56 For ease of comparison we repeat the relevant data for
the JLE and the JLS. Notice that while a number of law reviews
are cited more frequently than either, the gap has been closing and
by 1988 the JLE.and JLS both ranked within the top 10 law re-
views as measured by number of citations, and JLE was within the
top 5 57
We have compiled number of citations and impact factors for
the leading “pure” economics journals-the American Economic  Re-
view, the Journal of Political Economy,  and the Quarterly Journal of
Economics. We shall not burden the reader with additional tables
but shall report some highlights. Both AER and JPE were cited
more frequently than the Harvard Law Review in 1988, and the
number of citations in SSCI to economic journals is rising relative
to citations to law journals- w h i l e citations to JLS and JLE are
rising even faster. This pattern suggests, consistent with a number
of our earlier findings, that economics is growing relative to other
social sciences, particularly law. It may therefore seem surprising
that so few citations to the mainline economics journals are by
writers in law journals (about 95 percent of the citations to the
AER and JPE appear in other economics journals, implying that
fewer than 5 percent are in law journals). Legal scholars may be
more comfortable citing law and economics journals for economic
propositions than economic journals because the former are geared
to an audience composed at least partly of lawyers, whereas pure
economics journals are directed to pure economists and reflect the
growing mathematization and formalization of economics. This is
further evidence for the growth of economics. As a market, includ-
% According to the rankings of law schools in the April 29, 1991, issue
of U.S. News & Wodd Report.
57 As loyal Chicagoans,  8 we note with distress  that the University of
Chicago Law Review does poorly in relation to the reviews  of the law schools
with which the University of Chicago Law School is usually grouped. Part of
the explanation may be that the UGverJity of Chicago Law Review, because of
the law school’s  relatively small enrollment,  is a quarterly. Impact factors
control  for this, and raise the Review’s rank to fourth in 1988.  However, the
instability  of impact  factors from year to year, well illustrated by Table 17,
makes us reluctant to place much weight upon them.
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ing an intellectual market, grows, there are increasing economies of
specialization. Economics is becoming many fields, and law and
economics is one of the most thriving of them.
TABLE 18
CITATIONS  IN LAW REVIEWS  AND JUDICIAL
OPINIONS TO ARTICLES  IN SELECTED  LAW
REVIEWS,  1975 - 1988
Types of No. of Law Re-
Article Articles
Judicial Percent
view  Cita- Citations Judicial
tions Citations
Doctrinal 160 4273 740 14.8
Economics 49 1155 170 12.8
Philosophy 17 625 40 60 0
CLS 13 542 8 15l
Feminism 5 150 3 20 0
History 17 275 29 95
Other 58 1061 125 -_ Id5 0
Notes: (1) The ar 1fcles in column 2 exclude replies and student notes.
(2) The “other” category includes comparative law, empirical studies
not otherwise classifiable,  law and political  science,  and legal
sociology.
At the outset of this paper, we talked about the influence of
economics on practical law, as well as academic law, but we never
turned quantitative about that influence. It is possible, however, to
use data on citations in judicial opinions to measure changes in the
relative number of citations to economics and other academic work.
Table 18 uses Shepard’s judicial-opinion and law-review databases
to compare citations in law reviews and in judicial opinions to arti-
cles, classified by type; published in the 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1988
volumes of the law reviews of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Stan-
ford, and Yale. Considering the thousands of judicial opinions in
the database, it is evident that judges (or their law clerks) don’t cite
many articles of any type; perhaps the reason is that they have so
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many cases to cite! At all events, although there are many fewer ju-
dicial citations to economics articles than to legal-doctrinal articles,
there are more than to any other interdisciplinary category. What is
more, the percentage of total citations that are judicial citations to
economics articles exceeds that of any other nondoctrinal category
and indeed approaches the doctrinal quite closely
The approach would be closer were it not that the lag between
law--review publication and citation by law reviews is much greater
than the lag between law-review publication and citation by judges.
This is not surprising given the methodological conservatism of
most judges, but it means that interdisciplinary citations are under-
represented in judicial citations because interdisciplinary legal studies
have been growing relative to doctrinal ones.
Conclusion
Although citation analysis as a method of evaluating influence
can be criticized, our analysis demonstrates considerable internal
consistency, considerable consistency with an independent litera-
ture (that of human capital), and considerable robustness-for we
have tried a variety of techniques and all point in the same direc-
tion. Of course much more can and we hope will be done to im-
prove our techniques. The samples can be enlarged, and interdisci-
plinary fields redefined along lines suggested by Dean Calabresi in
his prepared comment. Articles and opinions can be surveyed for
the frequency of economic (and other nonlegal) terminology. The
changing fraction of interdisciplinary excerpts in legal casebooks
can be studied. Nevertheless we believe that our study, limited as it
is, supports a tentative conclusion that the influence of economics
upon law was growing at least through the 1980s (it is too early to
speak about the 199Os), though the rate of growth may have slowed,
beginning in the mid-1980s; that the growth in the influence of
economics on law exceeded that of any other interdisciplinary or
untraditional approach to law; and that the traditional approach-
what we call “doctrinal analysis”-was in decline over this period
relative to interdisciplinary approaches in general and the economic
approach in particular. Even if our conclusions are deemed prema-
52 CHICAGO WORKING  PAPER IN LAW & ECONOMICS
ture, we hope that this paper marks an advance in the methodology
of citation analysis both generally and as applied to law. The legal
profession is preoccupied with citation; its preoccupation provides a
large though largely neglected field for quantitative study.
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